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T
he European Economic Community (EEC) was 
originally founded with the aim of fostering 
cooperation between Member States and har-
monizing their laws across economic and politi-
cal sectors. The necessary legislation at EEC level 
required the delegation of competences to the EEC, 
under the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (TEEC or more commonly known 
as the Treaty of Rome). However, no such provi-
sion regarding the harmonization of intellectual 
property law was included in the original TEEC. 
Regardless, this has not hindered the develop-
ment of the law in this area. The articles of the 
TEEC on the free movement of persons, services 
and capital, the prohibition on discrimination or 
the ban on export/import customs, limitations and 
other equivalent measures, as well as the right of 
establishment1 have all served as the foundation for 
harmonization in this field.2
The historical development of copyright law 
within the European Union can be separated into 
two distinct periods. The first being the European 
Court of Justice’s (ECJ) jurisprudence, prior to 
1991, and the second being the copyright direc-
tives that were adopted by the Council and the 
Parliament of the EEC since 1991. The ECJ case 
law largely focused on specific doctrinal questions, 
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such as the exhaustion of the distribution right3 and it 
did not directly address the enforcement of copyright. 
Enforcement rules were inserted into EU copyright 
law only via directives. The first relevant rule was 
included in the Software-Directive.4
In the 1990s, the European Union also actively 
participated in the negotiations of three significant 
international treaties, namely the TRIPS Agreement, 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO 
Phonograms and Performances Treaty (WPPT). The 
negotiators of the WCT/WPPT and the TRIPS 
Agreement had two key ambitions. Firstly, the interna-
tional harmonization of several issues was necessary, 
for example: the protection of computer programs and 
databases;5 the clarification of economic rights relat-
ing to Internet uses;6 the broadening of the scope of 
the three-step test to more/all limitations and excep-
tions;7 and the protection of digital rights manage-
ment (DRM).8 Secondly, delegates understood that 
these new substantive norms, as well as pre-existing 
norms, would become obsolete without any effective 
law enforcement regulation. This was particularly 
true with respect to the rapidly growing information 
superhighway.
The TRIPS Agreement 1994 included a significant 
amount of hard law enforcement provisions, includ-
ing provisional measures,9 civil and administrative 
procedures and remedies. These cover the rules on 
evidence, injunctions, damages, along with other rem-
edies, the right to information and indemnification of 
the defendant.10 Member States should guarantee that 
all procedures are effective and allow for expeditious 
remedies. Member States should not impose barriers 
to effective trade and should be fair and equitable, 
but these procedures should not be unnecessarily 
complicated and costly.11 The WCT/WPPT 1996 
also obliged signatories to introduce necessary mea-
sures to implement the rules of the WCT/WPPT.12 
It requested that Member States ensure that the 
available enforcement procedures are effective and 
that remedies expeditiously prevent infringements 
and deter further infringements.13 These norms have 
directly influenced the InfoSoc Directive 200114 and 
that of the Enforcement Directive 2004.
Following the adoption of these directives, 
momentous change has occurred in copyright law. 
Firstly, the amount of online copyright infringements 
has grown exponentially to an unforeseen level. 
This is clearly evidenced by facts such as the ease 
of infringement and circumvention of technological 
protection measures; the requirement of “reciprocity,” 
that is, the obligation of sharing between end users; 
the alleged lack of legitimacy of the copyright norms; 
and the illegal profitability and supply-demand mis-
match.15 In sum, a substantial gap exists between 
copyright norms and social realities. Indeed, “[a]ny 
attempt to legislate in opposition to current social 
norms is highly hazardous, especially since failure to 
achieve legal compliance undermines public confi-
dence in the legal system.”16
Secondly, the borderless nature of the Internet 
has led to challenges regarding the cross-border 
enforcement of copyrights.
Thirdly, in the last decade the ECJ was very active 
in its decisionmaking. Much has been written on the 
activism of the Court of Justice.17 This is similarly the 
case in the field of copyright law. Dozens of prelimi-
nary rulings were published by the ECJ, in which the 
forum interpreted the constantly growing number of 
directives and in several cases the ECJ adopted quite 
a reformatory approach. Are these existing EU copy-
right norms, that is, the acquis communautaire, effec-
tive enough to tackle online copyright infringements 
or, alternatively, should we take steps to amend the 
directives in order to properly respond to the current 
trends in copyright infringements?18
Trisha Meyer correctly noted that “when policy 
and stakeholder cooperation fail, litigation serves 
to restore order and cover harm done by infringe-
ments.”19 This article aims to collect and outline the 
most recent preliminary rulings of the ECJ;20 that 
is, the “law-in-action” relating to online copyright 
infringements. The article focuses on four different 
topics: (1) the disclosure of personal data of Internet 
users; (2) filtering and Web site blocking; (3) dam-
ages related to copyright infringements; and (4) the 
international private law aspects of copyright law 
enforcement. All topics will be analyzed using the 
same framework. To begin the relevant acquis com-
munautaire will be addressed. Second, the most recent 
rulings of the ECJ will be summarized. Third, the 
consequences of these rulings and their effect on the 
existing legislation will be considered.
Ultimately the conclusion is that amend-
ments to the acquis communautaire are inevitable. 
Enforcement of Copyrights over the Internet
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However, reaching consensus on what amendments 
to implement may prove more problematic and 
challenging than it was in 2001 and 2004, when the 
InfoSoc and Enforcement Directives were accepted. 
As part of this article’s concluding remarks, we will 
briefly examine the recent developments in the 
Digital Single Market Strategy (DSMS) and law 
enforcement.
CASE LAW 
DISCLOSURE OF PERSONAL DATA 
OF ONLINE COPYRIGHT INFRINGERS
Acquis Communautaire
In order to commit an online copyright infringe-
ment, end users have to connect to the Internet. In 
the process they inevitably leave some of their digital 
footprints in the system. For example, connecting 
to the Internet requires an Internet Protocol (IP) 
address that is a unique identifier assigned to each 
device connected to a TCP/IP network. Further, end 
users might need to subscribe to access Internet. Such 
a subscription necessitates that the Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) collects, uses and retains some of 
their personal data, especially their names and billing 
addresses. Moreover, all data relating to their com-
munications are stored or retained (“logged”) by the 
ISP, including their IP addresses.
During the mid-2000s, it became default prac-
tice for copyright holders to request ISPs to disclose 
the most important personal data of their clients 
who had allegedly committed online copyright 
infringements, most often via peer-to-peer (P2P) 
file-sharing sites. Nevertheless, the European Union 
has a detailed set of rules regarding the collec-
tion, retention, and disclosure of personal data by 
electronic commerce service providers and these 
norms pose some limitations on such enforcement 
practices.
The Enforcement Directive allows claimants to 
request courts to order service providers to disclose 
infringers’ personal data, in particular their names 
and addresses.21 Additionally, in accordance with 
the provisions of the Telecoms Package, Member 
States are obliged to ensure that the “communica-
tions and the related traffic data by means of a pub-
lic communications network and publicly available 
electronic communications services” are kept confi-
dential.22 This default rule might be broken “when 
such restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate, 
and proportionate measure within a democratic soci-
ety to safeguard national security (i.e., State security), 
defense, public security, and the prevention, investi-
gation, detection and prosecution of criminal offenses 
or of unauthorized use of the electronic communica-
tion system.”23 Both the InfoSoc Directive and the 
Enforcement Directive confirm that they apply without 
prejudice to the European norms on data protection 
and privacy.24
The protection and enforcement of copyrights, 
as well as the protection of personal data are listed 
as fundamental rights in the European Union.25 The 
judiciary shall therefore cautiously balance these 
rights, as well as the freedom to receive and impart 
information (and consequently the freedom of com-
munication) and on the side of ISPs the freedom to 
conduct a business.26 The need for such balance is 
indirectly confirmed by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. According to Article 52 on the principle of 
proportionality
[a]ny limitation on the exercise of the rights 
and freedoms recognised by this Charter must 
be provided for by law and respect the essence 
of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the 
principle of proportionality, limitations may 
be made only if they are necessary and genu-
inely meet objectives of general interest rec-
ognised by the Union or the need to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others.
The European Commission previously has 
warned of the potential clash between several funda-
mental rights in the online copyright environment. 
According to the Commission
the adoption of blocking measures necessarily 
implies a restriction of human rights (…) and 
therefore, it can only be imposed by law, sub-
ject to the principle of proportionality, with 
respect to the legitimate aims pursued and to 
their necessity in a democratic society.27
The ECJ has been tasked with balancing these 
fundamental rights of copyright law and privacy/per-
sonal data in three significant cases.28
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ECJ Case Law
In Promusicae v. Telefónica and LSG v. Tele2, 
the plaintiffs represented producers and publishers of 
musical and audiovisual recordings. The defendants, 
Telefónica and Tele2, respectively, provided Internet 
access services on a commercial scale. Their services 
were used by end users to infringe copyrights by using 
P2P file-sharing programs. As the plaintiffs aimed 
to sue the end users for copyright infringements, 
Promusicae and LSG requested the disclosure of 
the identities and physical addresses, as well as the 
IP addresses,29 date and time of connection to the 
Internet of certain infringers.30
Under Spanish Law 34/2002 on information 
society services and electronic commerce, the data 
sought by Promusicae is authorized only in a criminal 
investigation or for the purpose of safeguarding public 
security and national defense, but not in civil pro-
ceedings or as a preliminary measure for civil proceed-
ings.31 Whereas, under Article 87b(3) of the Austrian 
Copyright Act, the provision of personal data in civil 
(copyright) cases is allowed.32 As intellectual property 
rights shall be effectively enforced, there seemed to 
be a tension between the separate fundamental rights 
and thus not surprisingly both the Commercial Court 
No. 5 of Madrid and the Austrian Supreme Court 
referred their cases to the ECJ.33
In these preliminary rulings the ECJ decided that 
the E-Commerce Directive, the InfoSoc Directive, the 
Enforcement Directive and the e-Privacy Directive do 
not require34 or preclude35 Member States from insert-
ing an obligation to reveal personal data in order 
to ensure effective protection of copyright in civil 
proceedings. This means that when a Member State, 
such as Spain, implemented the directives literally, 
the disclosure of personal data in civil proceedings is 
not allowed. ISPs shall, however, comply with court 
injunctions where the Member State, such as Austria, 
explicitly allows for the provision of personal data of 
end users as part of civil proceedings against alleged 
copyright infringers.
In Bonnier, the applicants were publishing com-
panies who held exclusive rights to reproduce, pub-
lish, and distribute 27 audio books. These audio 
books were illegally disseminated to the public via File 
Transfer Protocol servers. The Plaintiffs, Promusicae 
and LSG, requested the provision of relevant personal 
data from the defendant ePhone under Article 53c 
of the Swedish Copyright Act.36 The Swedish ISP 
refused to comply with the request claiming that 
such disclosure would run against the Data Retention 
Directive.37 The Swedish Supreme Court requested a 
preliminary ruling from the ECJ to clarify whether 
the Data Retention Directive could preclude the disclo-
sure of personal data in civil cases. They also asked 
whether the defendant could effectively resist such a 
provision even if the directive was not implemented 
by Sweden and that neither Promusicae and LSG, 
nor the Swedish domestic laws referred to the Data 
Retention Directive.38
The ECJ noted that “it follows from a combined 
reading of Article  11 and recital 12 of Directive 
2006/24 that that directive constitutes a special and 
restricted set of rules, derogating from and replacing 
Directive 2002/58 general in scope and, in particular, 
Article  15(1) thereof.”39 Nevertheless, the Swedish 
national law was found to serve different purposes 
from those covered by the Data Retention Directive and 
thus the latter did not apply to the Swedish Copyright 
Act. It is similarly irrelevant that Sweden missed its 
deadline to implement the directive into its national 
laws.40
Consequently, the ECJ reaffirmed its former rul-
ings, whereby Member States are not precluded from 
laying down an obligation to reveal personal data 
in order to ensure effective protection of copyright 
in civil proceedings, supposed that such a disclosure 
guarantees the proper balancing of fundamental 
rights.41 Such balance is guaranteed by the Swedish 
domestic rules as they allow for the provision of per-
sonal data of those end-users only where the plaintiff 
shows clear evidence that someone has committed an 
infringement and where the disclosure of information 
outweighs “the nuisance or other harm which the 
measure entails for the person affected by it or for 
some other conflicting interest.”42
Discussion
The trio of rulings outlined above clarified that 
Member States might choose from two options when 
it is about the disclosure of personal data in civil 
proceedings. In the first scenario, the default rule is 
that personal data shall be provided in accordance 
with the EU directives. In these countries, such as 
Spain, the enforcement of copyrights can practically 
be excluded, because the relevant directives do not 
list copyright or civil matters in general among the 
reasons for disclosure. Yet, under the second scenario, 
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the domestic rules might require that personal data 
be revealed in civil proceedings. In this case, the 
protection of personal data and the protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be 
treated as equally important fundamental rights. Both 
can be limited in order to effectuate the other. It is 
the Member States’ obligation to introduce a bal-
anced regulation where the functioning of the two 
distinct interests is guaranteed. The Swedish solution 
is one such example of a balanced system. It respects 
and guarantees the confidentiality of personal data, 
however, it allows for data to be revealed in certain 
circumstances, where the end user is convincingly 
charged of committing illegal acts.
The vast majority of Member States follow the 
first option. Consequently, the disclosure of personal 
data of individuals accused of infringing copyrights 
did not gain traction as a traditional and typical form 
of law enforcement.43 Not surprisingly, copyright 
holders looked for another strategy to repress online 
piracy. They understood that the most effective way 
to tackle infringements could be to “grab the bottle at 
the neck,” that is, to focus on intermediaries. Unlike 
individual infringers, their number is limited, they are 
geographically reachable, they are in better financial 
conditions, they have all the capabilities to prevent 
these infringements, and they are also strictly focus-
ing on their reputation. Therefore, since 2010, right 
holders have taken steps against intermediaries in 
order to prevent copyright infringements.
FILTERING AND WEB SITE BLOCKING
Acquis Communautaire
The responsibility and liability of intermediaries 
is regulated by the European Union in a complex, 
multidimensional way.44 First, electronic commerce 
is regulated in a dedicated directive.45 This directive 
includes “a scale of responsibility: liability increases 
proportionally with the editorial role of service pro-
viders.”46 According to it, safe harbor provisions exist 
for the benefit of mere conduit,47 caching,48 and host-
ing service providers.49 These intermediaries are not 
liable for the copyright infringements committed via 
or with their systems, supposed they are unaware of 
the infringing activity and/or they act expeditiously 
to remove or make unavailable the infringing materi-
als via their systems.
The liability of these intermediaries “increases 
proportionally with the editorial role of service pro-
viders.”50 For example, mere conduit service providers 
have the smallest available information on the contents 
transferred via their system and so their liability remains 
quite small. Whereas, hosting service providers have 
the strongest ability to oversee the use of their platforms 
and accordingly they should operate with caution.
As a significant addendum, the E-Commerce 
Directive prohibits Member States from imposing 
a general obligation to “monitor the information 
which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation 
actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating ille-
gal activity.”51 This prohibition of general monitoring 
is applicable for all e-commerce service providers. 
The main purpose of the immunity envisaged by 
the directive is to guarantee the proper functioning 
and constant development of the Internet and the 
related service providers. According to the European 
Commission, “online platform companies” had a mar-
ket capitalization of USD 3.9 trillion.52
The safe harbor provisions do not mean, how-
ever, that intermediaries are fully exempt from safe-
guarding the effective functioning of IP rights. As 
intermediaries have the closest relationship with the 
infringers they are best placed to bring those infringe-
ments to an end.53 Therefore, they should be subject 
to injunctions under Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc 
Directive and Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive. 
Such injunctions also are available as provisional 
or precautionary measures to prevent any copyright 
infringements.54 In sum, the acquis communautaire 
allows right holders to issue injunctions to those 
intermediaries that contribute actively or passively to 
copyright infringements both before and after trial.
Nevertheless, the balancing of these norms is not 
an easy task. First, the Enforcement Directive expressly 
notes that it leaves the rules of the E-Commerce 
Directive intact.55 Second, intermediaries are going to 
be more and more active in running their businesses. 
They are turning from passive to active content pro-
viders and their knowledge on the use of their systems 
is far less questionable than it once was. Third, the 
protection and effective enforcement of copyrights is 
equally confirmed by Recital 45, as well as Articles 
12(3), 13(2), 14(3), and 18(1) of the E-Commerce 
Directive. The tension between and the difficult appli-
cation of these two directives is exemplified by recent 
ECJ case law.56
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ECJ Case Law
In the first two cases that will be considered 
herein, a Belgian collective society, SABAM, sued an 
ISP (Scarlet Extended, originally Tiscali) and a social 
networking site (Netlog) for not complying with the 
plaintiff ’s request to filter out infringing materials 
transmitted over and hosted in their systems. Both 
defendants tried to rely on the safe harbor provisions 
of the E-Commerce Directive.
In Scarlet Extended, the clients of the defen-
dant’s Internet service used unauthorized P2P file-
sharing applications to download musical works that 
belonged to SABAM. SABAM claimed that Scarlet 
Extended was the best placed to take measures to 
bring the copyright infringements to an end by block-
ing or making it impossible for the customers to send 
or receive files.57 Scarlet argued from the beginning 
that SABAM’s demand to filter out infringing materi-
als was not an effective solution, because there were 
numerous technological obstacles and several more 
straightforward alternatives available to countenance 
these infringements.58 Further, Scarlet Extended 
noted that Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive 
prohibits the imposition of general monitoring obli-
gations on service providers. The ECJ agreed with 
Scarlet Extended that SABAM’s filtering require-
ment was too broad. The Court of Justice concluded 
that the acquis communautaire precluded 
an injunction made against an internet ser-
vice provider which requires it to install a 
system for filtering all electronic communi-
cations passing via its services, in particu-
lar those involving the use of peer-to-peer 
software; which applies indiscriminately to 
all its customers; as a preventive measure; 
exclusively at its expense; and for an unlim-
ited period, which is capable of identifying 
on that provider’s network the movement 
of electronic files containing a musical, 
cinematographic or audio-visual work in 
respect of which the applicant claims to hold 
intellectual-property rights, with a view to 
blocking the transfer of files the sharing of 
which infringes copyright.59
Shortly after the publication of Scarlet Extended, 
the ECJ concluded that a similarly broad request for 
an injunction by SABAM against a hosting service 
provider was precluded by the EU directives. By way 
of a brief background, Netlog users could build virtual 
communities and publish video clips on their profile 
pages. Such postings occurred without the authoriza-
tion of SABAM and without any payment to them. 
As Netlog was unwilling to pay for its clients’ post-
ings, SABAM requested the Brussels Court of First 
Instance order Netlog to filter out the infringing 
materials from its system. Netlog argued that EU law 
prohibits imposing any general monitoring obliga-
tions on hosting service providers.60
The ECJ recognized that SABAM could only ask 
for an injunction against intermediaries under Article 
8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive and Article 11 of the 
Enforcement Directive, if the injunction complied with 
the safe harbor doctrine detailed within Article 15(1) 
of the E-commerce Directive. In fact, SABAM’s request 
for a general filtering mechanism ran against Article 3 
of the Enforcement Directive, whereby all enforcement 
measures must be fair and proportionate and must not 
be excessively costly.61
The ECJ has further stressed that IP rights 
deserve protection under Article 17(2) of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. At the 
same time, IP rights are not absolute and their exercise 
should be subject to the effective functioning of other 
fundamental rights,62 including the freedom to con-
duct a business, the protection of personal data and 
the freedom to receive information. Consequently, 
the ECJ stressed in both preliminary rulings that strik-
ing a balance of the different fundamental rights is a 
priority of EU law.63 The ECJ concluded in both cases 
that SABAM’s filtering injunctions would endanger 
the operation of these fundamental rights.64 This 
conclusion means that copyright law does not work as 
primus inter pares. It is only one of the many important 
fundamental rights that should be guaranteed by EU 
law, but that protection should never extend so far as 
to impede other rights.
Following the failure to force conduit and host-
ing service providers generally to filter out infringing 
materials from their systems, right holders adopted a 
different approach to targeting these providers. They 
requested ISPs to block access to specific infringing 
Web sites.
In Telekabel, two motion pictures producers, 
Constantin Film and Wega, requested an Austrian 
ISP to block access to Kino.to, a German pirate 
streaming website. UPC Telekabel Wien resisted 
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complying with the order, in particular referring to 
Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive. They claimed 
that they had no business contact with the infringing 
website; that it could not be proved that its customers 
committed any copyright infringements; that various 
blocking measures could technically be circumvented; 
and that these measures were rather expensive.65 
Upon the request of the Austrian Supreme Court, 
the ECJ had to decide whether UPC Telekabel Wien 
could be classified as an intermediary as outlined in 
Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive. Further, the ECJ 
was required to answer whether it was acceptable 
to require a mere conduit service provider to take 
specific measures to make it more difficult to access 
a website containing unlawful contents, if those mea-
sures are expensive and can easily be circumvented 
without any special technical knowledge.66
The ECJ noted that under Article 8(3) of the 
InfoSoc Directive the term “intermediary” covers “any 
person who carries a third party’s infringement of 
a protected work or other subject-matter in a net-
work.”67 Consequently, no contractual relationship 
between UPC Telekabel Wien and Kino.to was 
necessary to categorize the ISP as an intermediary.68 
Thus, the ISP could be subject to injunctions under 
the InfoSoc Directive, if the plaintiff could prove that 
any end user accessed the infringing materials via the 
ISP’s system.69
The ECJ reaffirmed that striking a fair balance 
between the several, often competing, fundamen-
tal rights is necessary whenever a court considers 
ordering an injunction against an intermediary.70 In 
Telekabel, the freedom of information, the freedom 
to conduct a business and the protection of intel-
lectual property rights were all at stake.71 The Court 
of Justice confirmed that end-users shall be granted 
the chance to protect their fundamental rights.72 
Further, unlike in the two SABAM cases, the ECJ 
found that the film producers’ request to force an 
ISP to reach a given result (Erfolgsverbot) repre-
sented a balanced approach. More precisely, the ECJ 
concluded that 
the fundamental rights recognised by EU 
law must be interpreted as not precluding 
a court injunction prohibiting an internet 
service provider from allowing its customers 
access to a website placing protected subject-
matter online without the agreement of the 
rightholders when that injunction does not 
specify the measures which that access pro-
vider must take and when that access provider 
can avoid incurring coercive penalties for 
breach of that injunction by showing that it 
has taken all reasonable measures, provided 
that (i) the measures taken do not unneces-
sarily deprive internet users of the possibility 
of lawfully accessing the information available 
and (ii) that those measures have the effect 
of preventing unauthorised access to the pro-
tected subject-matter or, at least, of making it 
difficult to achieve and of seriously discourag-
ing internet users who are using the services of 
the addressee of that injunction from access-
ing the subject-matter that has been made 
available to them in breach of the intellectual 
property right, that being a matter for the 
national authorities and courts to establish.73
More recently, in McFadden, the ECJ had to decide 
whether a provider of an open Wi-Fi hotspot could be 
considered an intermediary under Article 12(1) of the 
E-Commerce Directive, and if so, could it be liable for 
copyright infringements carried out by the users of the 
wireless network?74 The ECJ provided an affirmative 
response to both aspects. First, the Court of Justice 
noted that McFadden provided his service as a com-
munication network operator and made that network 
available to the members of the general public free of 
charge. This led the ECJ to conclude that McFadden’s 
service was an information society service.75 The ECJ 
further noted that the access was provided by McFadden 
as a technical, automatic and passive process, serving 
the transmission of the required information. Aside 
from these grounds, no further conditions needed to 
be satisfied in order for someone to be deemed a mere 
conduit service provider.76 Consequently, McFadden 
could be ordered to protect his Wi-Fi hotspot, in order 
to prevent copyright infringements.77 In doing so, the 
provider could freely choose the applicable technical 
measures to fulfill the requirements of the injunction. 
The ECJ noted that password-protection is one such 
example of an acceptable, balanced and proportional 
solution.78
Discussion
The ECJ case law confirmed that ISPs are subject 
to injunctions, irrespective of their immunity under 
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the E-Commerce Directive. Nevertheless, as the age old 
adage goes the devil is in the detail. First, the two Sabam 
rulings made it clear that no general obligations could 
be imposed against them. However, these preliminary 
rulings did not address where the dividing line between 
blanket blocking injunctions and strictly targeted, result 
tailored or specific obligations lies. In these decisions, 
it is hard to anlayze which elements of the failed 
requests of SABAM should be prioritized and which 
are unsupportable. Nevertheless, the rulings left open 
the possibility of imposing narrow/specific or strictly 
targeted obligations on ISPs. This was later affirmed 
in Telekabel.79 There, the ECJ found that an injunction 
with a reasonably limited scope is capable of striking a 
fair balance between the differing fundamental rights.
Second, irrespective of the evolving ECJ case 
law, the application of the acquis communautaire in the 
Member States shows stark contrasts.80 Filtering and 
blocking injunctions were issued by courts in many 
countries within the European Union.81 These sys-
tems efficiently tackled unlawful practices in Portugal 
and the United Kingdom. This discussion begins by 
introducing the English jurisprudence.
In Newzbin, the High Court ruled that Newzbin 
was jointly and severally liable for the unlawful down-
loading of illegal contents by the end-users through 
the indexing portal ran by Newzbin. This was because 
the operators of the site knew about the large scale 
infringements, yet chose to do nothing to bring these 
infringements to an end.82 Following this litigation, 
Newzbin declared bankruptcy and ceased trading. 
Right holders reacted to the appearance of Newzbin2 
with a request for an injunction against British 
Telecom. In Twentieth C v. British Telecommunication 
the High Court issued an injunction against British 
Telecom based on the fact that its network was used 
by infringers and it had actual knowledge of these 
infringements after the right holders reported them 
to it.83 The High Court confirmed the compatibility 
of such an injunction with Articles 12 and 15(1) of 
the E-Commerce Directive.84 Shortly thereafter, in 
Dramatico v. Sky, the right holders aimed to block 
access to the notorious site known as ‘The Pirate Bay’. 
In order to achieve this, they sued several ISPs at 
the same time. The High Court ruled in favor of the 
applicants and ordered the defendants to block access 
to ‘The Pirate Bay’ as the infringements were carried 
out through their networks and they had knowledge 
of the wrongful acts.85
The blocking of ‘The Pirate Bay’ can be deemed 
a modest success. Right holders developed their 
strategy and sued several ISPs at the same time and 
requested the simultaneous blocking of numerous 
infringing Web sites. In EMI v. Sky, the High Court 
ordered the blocking of access to KAT, H33T and 
Fenopy indexing sites.86 Following the successful fight 
against P2P service providers, English right holders 
opened new fronts against sports streaming sites87 and 
several other video streaming sites.88
This brief examination of British case law con-
firms the validity of blocking injunctions, at least on 
a national level. The proportionality of injunctions 
is evidenced by the fact that ISPs did not oppose the 
measures and they considered the implementation 
costs to be modest.89 The effectiveness of the blocking 
injunctions also can be demonstrated by the fact that 
when the majority of telecommunication companies 
were targeted at the same time and were ordered to 
comply with the injunction for a longer period of 
time legal streaming services saw immediate spikes 
in demand. For example, in 2013 the number of 
consumers who visited paid streaming sites increased 
by 12 percent following a series of injunctions90 and 
closing MegaUpload raised the market share of digital 
movie stores by 6-8 percent.91
If we now turn our attention away from the 
UK example and towards the second country cited 
Portugal we can see similar results. The efficacy of 
blocking practices in Portugal, another Member State 
of the European Union, is evidenced by INCOPRO’s 
survey. According to this survey, the blockade of 
65 out of the top 250 unauthorized sites led to the 
decrease of their usage in Portugal by 56.6 percent 
over the period of September 2015 to October 2016, 
whilst comparatively the usage of these sites increased 
by 3.9 percent globally.92
McFadden is another milestone in the history of 
copyright enforcement within the European Union. 
The ECJ held that an individual could be an access 
service provider and at the same time it used the 
concept of indirect liability against the operator of 
a Wi-Fi hotspot. However, the reformatory use of 
indirect liability has gained criticism, as well as the 
ECJ’s opinion that declared password protection an 
effective measure. Further, the Court of Justice went 
beyond the boundaries of the safe harbor doctrine 
of Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, when it 
recognized Sony Music’s rights to damages and costs.93
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The concept of indirect liability was further devel-
oped by the ECJ in its recent ruling in Stichting Brein v. 
Ziggo. In the original procedure the Dutch anti-piracy 
foundation, Stichting Brein, requested two ISPs, Ziggo 
and XS4ALL, block both the domain name and the IP 
address of the notorious ‘The Pirate Bay’. Irrespective 
of the other aspects of this ruling, what is arguably most 
important is the fact that the ECJ followed its earlier 
decisions94 and concluded that ‘The Pirate Bay’ com-
municated the protected subject matter to the public 
by creating and maintaining a system for this purpose. 
The operators of ‘The Pirate Bay’ intervened with 
full knowledge of the consequences of their conduct 
to provide access to the protected works by indexing 
torrent files on their online sharing platform. Without 
such a platform the end users would be unable to locate 
and share the works. The end users formed a public, as 
they consisted of an indeterminate but large number 
of people. They also formed a new public, as they 
were not originally taken into account by the right 
holders when the initial communication of the works 
was authorized. The Pirate Bay’s liability was further 
supported by its unwillingness to react or respond 
to the notices it received from the right holders 
about the infringements, as well as the fact that it oper-
ated the website with the purpose of obtaining profit 
from advertisements.95
This ruling is of significant importance for several 
reasons. First, it reaffirmed the concept of indirect lia-
bility developed by the ECJ in McFadden.96 Practically 
speaking, website operators who are not using the 
protected subject matters directly, as all contents are 
downloaded, stored and made available by end users, 
are indirectly liable if their system is used by their 
clients to infringe copyrights. Consequently, these 
intermediaries can be targeted by right holders under 
Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive, and can be forced 
to pay substantial damages to right holders, as well as 
being instructed to bring the infringements to an end.
Second, suing the Web site operators is still 
unfortunately not the most effective way of law 
enforcement. Most of these intermediaries offer their 
services from non-EU countries and thus jurisdic-
tional problems might arise. Moving to another 
domain is also an easy option for Web site operators.
Third, the indirect liability of system opera-
tors does not mean at all that Article 8(3) of the 
InfoSoc Directive and Article 11 of the Enforcement 
Directive have become useless. The most effective 
way of reducing the harm caused by online copyright 
infringements remains to order an ISP to block access 
to or filter the infringing materials from their systems. 
Practice will show, whether ISPs or system operators 
are going to be the real ‘police officers’ of online copy-
right infringements.
CALCULATION OF DAMAGES FOR 
ONLINE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENTS
Acquis Communautaire
European countries traditionally allow for the 
recovery of actual damages for copyright infringe-
ments. This is equally true for online copyright 
infringements. The European Union also has harmo-
nized such an approach in the Enforcement Directive. 
According to it
Member States shall ensure that the compe-
tent judicial authorities, on application of the 
injured party, order the infringer who know-
ingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, 
engaged in an infringing activity, to pay the 
rightholder damages appropriate to the actual 
prejudice suffered by him/her as a result of the 
infringement.
When the judicial authorities set the damages:
(a) they shall take into account all appropri-
ate aspects, such as the negative economic 
consequences, including lost profits, which 
the injured party has suffered, any unfair prof-
its made by the infringer and, in appropriate 
cases, elements other than economic factors, 
such as the moral prejudice caused to the 
rightholder by the infringement, or
(b) as an alternative to (a), they may, in 
appropriate cases, set the damages as a lump 
sum on the basis of elements such as at least 
the amount of royalties or fees which would 
have been due if the infringer had requested 
authorisation to use the intellectual property 
right in question.97
The first sentence of Article 13(1) looks crys-
tal clear. However, as Article 13(1)(b) allows for 
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setting the damages as a lump sum, the Enforcement 
Directive inevitably opened the doors for a debate 
over the appropriate limits on such a sum. Is double 
or triple the amount of hypothetical royalties calcu-
lated under the statute still an appropriate remedy 
or is it already punitive damages and, at the same 
time, an abuse of rights under Article 3(2) of the 
Enforcement Directive? The ECJ faced these questions 
in OTK v. SFP.
ECJ Case Law
SFP is a Polish collective society that manages 
copyrights in audiovisual works. OTK broadcasted 
television programs via cable network in a Polish 
town, Oława. Following the termination of the con-
tract between SFP and OTK, the latter continued to 
communicate copyrighted works to the public and 
asked the Copyright Commission of Poland to estab-
lish a new rate of fee for the use. OTK duly paid the 
newly established fee to SFP, however, SFP disagreed 
with the calculation. SFP brought an action against 
OTK in order to prohibit the retransmission of the 
protected audiovisual works until a new agreement 
could be concluded by OTK and SFP. Furthermore, 
SFP asked for damages for the unauthorized use. 
The Polish Supreme Court was uncertain about the 
application of Article 13 of the Enforcement Directive 
and so it referred the case to the ECJ. The ECJ was 
tasked with deciding whether right holders could 
seek redress for their damages on the basis of general 
principles, or whether they could request the payment 
of a lump sum corresponding to twice the amount of 
the license fee, or, in the event of a culpable infringe-
ment, three times the amount of the license fee. 
The Court of Justice was further requested to decide 
whether a double amount of damages should be 
treated as punitive damages.98
The ECJ recalled that recital 3 and Article 3(2) 
of the Enforcement Directive requires the procedures 
and remedies provided by Member States to be effec-
tive, proportionate, and dissuasive.99 The ECJ also 
noted that a double damages clause does not necessar-
ily run against the Enforcement Directive. Admittedly, 
recital 26 of the Enforcement Directive has stressed 
that it was not the aim to introduce an obligation 
for punitive damages, but “to allow for compensation 
based on an objective criterion while taking account 
of the expenses incurred by the rightholder, such as 
the costs of identification and research.” The ECJ 
reasoned that this position of the EU legislation could 
not be interpreted as prohibiting Member States 
from introducing punitive damages. Nevertheless, 
the Court of Justice found it unnecessary to discuss 
whether punitive damages were in compliance with 
Article 13 of the Enforcement Directive, as the Polish 
domestic rules did not introduce such a system.100
The ECJ decided that the mere payment of a 
hypothetical royalty is not capable of guarantee-
ing the compensation of the actual losses. Such 
compensation would not ensure the reimbursement 
of the costs linked to researching and identifying 
possible acts of infringement, the compensation for 
possible moral prejudice or the payment of interest 
on the sums due. Indeed, the plaintiff convincingly 
evidenced at the hearing that the double amount of 
hypothetical royalty objectively reflected its losses, 
including costs related to law enforcement.101
In sum, the ECJ found that Article 13 of the 
Enforcement Directive allows right holders to seek 
redress for their actual damages or, without having to 
prove the actual loss, for twice the license fee which 
would have been due under the contract with the 
collecting society.102
Discussion
Some have argued that the ECJ has opened the 
doors for punitive damages through obiter dicta.103 
Admittedly, the ECJ has noted that Member States 
are not precluded from introducing more protective 
measures and that EU law cannot be interpreted as 
precluding Member States from introducing puni-
tive damages.104 We, however, disagree with such an 
opinion. Recital 26 did not expressly prohibit the 
regulation of punitive damages by Member States, 
but only reflected the European legislature’s unwill-
ingness to do so. The ratio of that recital is that 
the compensation scheme in EU copyright law is 
an objective one that focuses mainly on the actual 
losses of the right holder. At the same time, the right 
holder is entitled to the compensation of identifica-
tion and research costs relating to the infringement. 
Moreover, in cases where actual damages would be 
hard to calculate, right holders are entitled to ask 
for a lump sum. Such a lump sum should, however, 
remain reasonable and should comply with the losses 
incurred due to the infringement. If that is the case, 
the requested compensation has no punitive nature. 
Vice versa, if the requested damages would not reflect 
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the actual losses and expenses of the right holder, the 
right holder’s claim would represent an abuse of rights 
under Article 3(2) of the Enforcement Directive.
There is no way of introducing punitive damages 
by Member States, if this interpretation is correct. 
Per definitionem, punitive damages must be more than 
actual damages plus costs of enforcement. A portion 
of punitive damages must aim to punish and repress 
infringers, but that seems incompatible with recital 
26 and Articles 3(2) and 13(1) of the Enforcement 
Directive.
ONLINE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENTS 
AND INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW
Acquis Communautaire
Suing someone for copyright infringements is not 
only an issue of substantive law, but also one of pro-
cedural law. Indeed, infringements having an inter-
national character require right holders to correctly 
identify the most appropriate forum for proceedings. 
This is especially true for online copyright infringe-
ments. This is where the norms of international pri-
vate law on jurisdiction come into play.
The Brussels I Regulation105 allows for significant 
flexibility for the benefit of plaintiffs in selecting the 
forum. As a general rule, Article 2(1) declares that 
“[s]ubject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a 
Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be 
sued in the courts of that Member State.” This gen-
eral rule is supplanted by special, exceptional norms. 
Article 3 allows for the suing of infringers in the 
courts of Member States other than the infringers’ 
domicile. Most importantly, infringers can be sued “in 
matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the 
courts for the place where the harmful event occurred 
or may occur.”106 Further, under Article  6(1), any 
court might try more infringements at the same 
time, if it has jurisdiction over at least one of those 
infringements.
Consequently, EU law presents plaintiffs, who 
will most probably be copyright holders, with a cer-
tain degree of flexibility to sue infringers at least in 
front of courts of two different Member States. It is 
a practical and tactical question as to which forum 
should be selected by the plaintiff, because each 
forum will have different procedures, timescales, rules 
and varying degrees of awardable damages.
ECJ Case Law
In the first case to be discussed, Mr. Pinckney 
brought an action against Mediatech before the 
Regional Court of Toulouse after he discovered that 
his 12 songs had been illegally reproduced on CDs 
in Austria. Later, the CDs were marketed and sold 
online without authorization by British corpora-
tions. Mediatech, seated in Austria, challenged the 
jurisdiction of the French court and claimed that 
only Austrian courts had jurisdiction to hear the 
case. The ECJ had to decide whether Article 5(3) of 
the Brussels I Regulation allowed right holders to sue 
anywhere, where the content was made available via 
the Internet, or whether it also required that the con-
tent be directed to the public of that specific country 
where jurisdiction was sought.107
The ECJ noted that Article 5(3) speaks of a rule 
on special jurisdiction, which must be interpreted 
restrictively. The Court of Justice confirmed that the 
phrase “place where the harmful event occurred or 
may occur” intended to cover both the place where 
the damages occurred and the place of the event 
giving rise to it and thus it allows the plaintiff to 
bring an action in all relevant places.108 Hence, the 
court of the place where the alleged infringer has 
his place of domicile would be the most appropri-
ate place to bring an action, in order to have all the 
damages endorsed.109 Nevertheless, the applicant can 
sue before the court of any Member State in which 
the protected subject matter has been accessible via 
the Internet. Such courts have jurisdiction only to 
determine the damages caused in the Member State 
within which it is situated.110 If, however, the court 
selected has jurisdiction over the damages caused in 
other Member States [e.g., under Article 6(1) of the 
Brussels I Regulation],111 it can replace those courts in 
ascertaining whether copyrights have been infringed, 
in assessing the amount of damages and in determin-
ing the nature of the harm caused.112
More recently, in Hejduk, the ECJ faced again the 
question as to whether the making available of a pro-
tected subject matter (photographs) for viewing on 
and downloading from a German Web site also leads 
to the jurisdiction of courts in other Member States 
(namely, in Austria) where the Web site was acces-
sible.113 In Pinckney, the ECJ already concluded that 
the sole condition of the application of Article 5(3) 
is that a harmful event has occurred or may occur 
in a Member State and the Brussels I Regulation 
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does not require that the activity is directed to the 
Member State in which the court seized is situated.114 
Consequently, the defendant can be sued depending 
on the will of the applicant.115
In Hejduk, the Court of Justice recalled that 
copyrights are protected under the InfoSoc Directive 
automatically and, at the same time, on a territorial 
basis. This means that the infringements of these 
rights should be adjudicated in accordance with the 
domestic copyright rules.116 It must be taken into 
account that the use of the protected photographs 
occurred, when they were displayed and made acces-
sible for downloading on EnergieAgentur’s Web site. 
As the company has placed the photographs on its 
Web site, such an act of making available to the pub-
lic, that is, the event giving rise to a possible infringe-
ment, happened at the place where EnergieAgentur 
has its seat.117
The Court of Justice also found it irrelevant 
that the defendant’s domain name was registered in 
Germany, because the damages occurred or might 
occur in the country where the photographs were 
accessible.118
Finally, the ECJ reaffirmed that under Article 5(3) 
of the Brussels I Regulation the court seized has jurisdic-
tion only over those damages that occurred or might 
occur on its soil.119
Discussion
The Brussels I Regulation includes bright-line rules 
and ECJ case law has sought to clarify these rules. 
This system can be summarized with two keywords: 
(1) flexibility and (2) convenience. Flexible, as the 
plaintiff has total freedom to choose from at least 
two different jurisdictions when suing the infringer. 
Under the general rules, the court of the defendant’s 
domicile has jurisdiction and it can rule on all dam-
ages occurred. Under Article 5(3) the plaintiff can 
bring an action wherever damages occurred or may 
occur, including his own town, if that looks the best 
option for him. However, this court can only rule on 
the damages that occurred or may occur within that 
country. The word convenient was selected, because 
the plaintiff might select the forum depending upon 
on their own needs or preferences. If that looks easier 
(as in Pinckney), he does not even need to leave his 
own town. If, however, total coverage of damages is 
sought, the plaintiff must initiate the proceedings in 
the defendant’s country, except where another, more 
convenient forum has jurisdiction under Article 6(1) 
of the Brussels I Regulation.
Nevertheless, the ultimate decision, where and 
for what to sue is more complex than simply selecting 
the forum. The selection must be cautiously taken in 
light of an eclectic plethora of tactical factors, some 
of which were alluded to before, such as the nuances 
of the civil procedural rules, including but not limited 
to the length and costs of the trials, the amount and 
the method of payment of attorneys’ fees (including 
the recovery of the fees by the losing party), and the 
calculation of damages (including whether punitive 
damages are available or not).120
FUTURE ASPECTS OF 
COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
In the last decade or so, the activism of the ECJ 
has grown significantly in copyright law. The Court 
of Justice has been called on to provide preliminary 
rulings on various cases, during which it has had to 
provide interpretations on almost every single EU 
copyright directive. A notable amount of these cases 
centered on the digital economy. This article focused 
solely on those that were directly related to the 
enforcement of copyrights. The number of unresolved 
issues did not decrease after these rulings were pub-
lished. Indeed, technological developments and the 
growing number of new service models have led to 
the constant appearance of novel copyright disputes.
To recap, this article categorized the case law 
on copyright enforcement into four distinct groups. 
Among them, the international private law aspects of 
copyright enforcement are both regulated and applied 
clearly and logically. Further, although the applica-
bility of punitive damages is not prohibited by EU 
legislation or the judiciary, we believe that this form 
of sanctioning has no place within EU copyright law. 
The two remaining groups make it necessary to 
reconsider certain parts of the existing normative 
structure of the European Union.
First, the parallel norms of copyright law and data 
protection were hardly reconcilable. Data protection 
of end users trumped the interests of copyright holders 
for a long time. Importantly, the European Parliament 
and the Council attempted to put an end to this dis-
pute, when they adopted the General Data Protection 
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Regulation (GDPR) in 2016.121 Under Article 23(1)(j) 
of the GDPR the obligations and rights of data con-
trollers or processors may be restricted in order to 
safeguard the enforcement of civil law claims. In fact, 
the new GDPR codifies the opinion of the minority 
of Member States and replaces Article 13(1) of the 
current directive. Since regulations are directly appli-
cable in all Member States, the GDPR makes it oblig-
atory for Member States to regulate the disclosure of 
personal data of end users who infringe copyrights. In 
sum, the uncertainties surrounding law enforcement 
will be resolved and clarified after the GDPR comes 
into force on May 25, 2018.122
Second, the efficacy of Web site blocking and/or 
filtering is still not generally evidenced. So far, the 
British experiences are positive, but no other EU 
country has been able to show any similar success 
based on these injunctions. For example, in the 
Netherlands, researchers have shown that block-
ing file-sharing platforms is relatively ineffective 
in the battle to reduce unauthorized file-sharing.123 
The efficiency of Web site blocking/filtering will 
therefore depend on several specific factors. Among 
them, the most important is the selection of the most 
appropriate technology. To explain, the blocking of 
IP addresses is not a good solution, as an IP address 
can be used by multiple Web sites at the same time. 
Blocking access to a given IP address would lead to 
over-blocking, which would prove an untenable posi-
tion in light of the rules on proportionality. Christina 
Angelopoulos has noted correctly that “even mere 
blocking can have more extensive repercussions 
than intended: blocking entire websites, for example, 
risks collateral damage in the form of disallowing 
access to entirely legal content that happens to be 
hosted at the same address.”124 By way of comparison, 
blocking at DNS-level is more targeted, but can still 
negatively affect the access to many lawful domains. 
Whereas, blocking at URL-level would allow for the 
most direct way of law enforcement. However, such a 
solution is unfortunately the most expensive one as 
right holders need to invest a significant amount of 
resources into locating the specific Web sites offering 
unlawful materials. Additionally, the reproduction of 
an infringing Web site under a new URL would effec-
tively circumvent the blockade.125 
Not surprisingly, alternative solutions are sought 
to replace the complicated and sometimes contro-
versial Web site blocking/filtering practices. One 
particularly interesting idea is to request payment 
providers to restrict the access to the advertisement 
incomes of notorious service providers.126 The follow-
the-money approach started to gain ground in EU leg-
islation as well.127 Another solution is offered by the 
ECJ in McFadden and Stichting Brein. In both cases, 
although under different factual matrix’s, the Court 
of Justice confirmed that service providers might 
be indirectly liable for the copyright infringements 
committed by their clients. If this interpretation 
prevails, at least Wi-Fi access providers and torrent 
indexing sites, functioning as search engines and 
hosting service providers, can be directly targeted by 
right holders under the concept of communication to 
the public. Consequently, there will be no need for 
injunctions or for the use of a notice-and-take-down 
procedure against them. Indeed, they will be directly 
subject to claims of damages.
Equally important, the European Commission 
already has taken significant steps towards modernizing 
the digital environment of the European Union. As 
part of that, the Commission aims to reform copyright 
law. The Commission stresses that the status quo of the 
liability regime was “designed at a time when online 
platforms did not have the characteristics and scale 
they have today.”128 Without a doubt, the various types 
of online service providers have gained an unavoid-
able, central role in the dissemination of information, 
including copyrighted subject matter, over the Internet.
As a part of the DSMS, the EC properly noted 
that it is finally time to double-check the efficacy of 
the current harmonization of law enforcement rules. 
Indeed, some modifications are urgently needed to 
make this field of law up-to-date in the digital realm. 
The amendments must, however, keep the balance 
stressed above. As such, any reform in this field 
should not exaggerate the burden of e-commerce 
service providers. This is why the provisions on the 
so-called value gap deserve special attention.
The Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market aimed to oblige service providers 
that host large amounts of protected subject-matter 
and that play an active role by optimizing the presen-
tation of the uploaded contents. It also encouraged 
them to cooperate with right holders either to ensure 
the functioning of agreements concluded with right 
holders or to prevent the availability of protected 
subject matter on their services. The measures to 
prevent infringements should be appropriate and 
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proportionate. Effective content recognition tech-
nologies, adequate reporting on the functioning and 
the deployment of the measures, as well as complaints 
and redress mechanisms, were explicitly declared by 
the European Commission as reasonable measures.129
The new regime envisaged by the European 
Commission seemed to be incompatible with the exist-
ing EU e-commerce law. The European Commission 
rejected such criticism when it declared that the new 
obligation “should also apply when the information 
society service providers are eligible for the liabil-
ity exemption provided in Article 14 of Directive 
2000/31/EC.”130 The Commission’s explanation was 
not fully convincing. Indeed, depending on the exact 
content of appropriate and proportionate measures 
to prevent infringements, it could easily collide 
with Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive on the 
prohibition of general monitoring. As the ALAI’s 
resolution on the Commission’s proposal noted, “it 
will make it possible to prevent initial uploading of 
the content (ex ante blocking) following the provision 
of fingerprints enabling this to be done.”131 An effec-
tive ex ante blocking fits into the concept of general 
monitoring under the E-Commerce Directive.
Importantly, the European Parliament’s Comodini 
Report cut back the European Commission’s Proposal 
in several aspects.132 Amendment 21 and 23 replaced 
the reference to hosting service providers with those 
service providers who make available protected sub-
ject matter to the public, and whose service is not 
of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature. 
Amendment 22 deleted recital 38(2) from the pro-
posal and thus complaints and redress mechanisms 
are erased from the current version of the pro-
posal. Amendment 23 further erased the reference to 
Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive. Amendments 
56-61, in accordance with the above changes to 
recital 38, changed Article 13 significantly. For exam-
ple, amendment 59 and 60 inserted the rights of users 
to communicate works to the public in accordance 
with the exceptions or limitations introduced by the 
InfoSoc Directive and to enforce these rights in front 
of courts. Furthermore, Amendment 61 replaced the 
reference to content recognition technologies with 
the more general term of “measures.”
In sum, the rules on law enforcement need to 
be updated to meet modern-day demands and bal-
ance the competing interests of right holders, soci-
ety at large and service providers. However, as of 
August 4, 2017, the European Commission had still 
not disclosed its detailed concept on modernizing the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights within 
the European Union. As soon as this much awaited 
proposal is published, a more thorough analysis of the 
DSMS and the acquis communautaire and case law on 
law enforcement will become possible. Nonetheless, 
we should cautiously listen to Andreas Rahmatian, 
who has convincingly argued that deeper harmoniza-
tion might cause unnecessary troubles for the basic 
idea of the European Union.133
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